ABSTRACT Along with recent achievements in deep learning empowered by enormous amounts of training data, preserving the privacy of an individual related to the gathered data has been becoming an essential part of the public data collection and publication. Advancements in deep learning threaten traditional image anonymization techniques with model inversion attacks that try to reconstruct the original image from the anonymized image. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving adversarial protector network (PPAPNet) as an image anonymization tool to convert an image into another synthetic image that is both realistic and immune to model inversion attacks. Our experiments on various datasets show that PPAPNet can effectively convert a sensitive image into a high-quality and attack-immune synthetic image.
I. INTRODUCTION
Stimulated by recent achievements in deep learning in different research domains such as video recommendation [9] , facial recognition [36] , and medical diagnosis [15] , [39] , [43] , many companies and researchers are interested in using their own data to train state-of-the-art machine learning models. Well-known benchmark datasets [10] , [25] , [28] , [41] might be enough for researchers to compare the performance of their model with others, but this cannot lead to applications of their model in the real world. Because there is no free lunch, it is essential for companies to re-train ML models using their own dataset for the best performance before applying it to commercial services. This is where privacy issues come into effect.
Datasets including collections of images, speech, or videos from millions of individuals are ripe with privacy risks. Chaudhuri et al. [6] states that simply releasing only statistics or pre-trained machine learning models on sensitive datasets may not be sufficient to preserve privacy. They propose objective perturbation as a privacy-preserving machine learning algorithm design based on the sensitivity method proposed by Dwork et al. [12] . Their algorithm is private under the -differential privacy definition defined by Dwork et al. Synthetic data generation [4] , [27] , [42] is another technique in which sensitive data is partially or fully replaced
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with synthetic data before it is published. Synthetic data generation has taken the focus in recent years as a fundamental solution for privacy-preserving data publication. Beaulieu-Jones et al. [4] apply an objective perturbation [6] on ACGAN [33] to generate shareable biomedical data. However, the idea of applying objective perturbations to generative adversarial networks (GAN) [2] , [5] , [17] , [33] , [34] , [44] while training the network with image datasets [25] , [26] , [28] , [41] easily led to mode collapse [17] , [34] in our prior attempts.
Instead of doing the hard work of trying to apply objective perturbations on GAN to generate a synthetic image in a differentially private way, we developed an advanced mechanism for traditional image anonymization, adding noise to an image. Recent research by Fredrikson et al. [16] suggests that it is possible to recover (up to a certain degree) individual faces from images that are blurred-out to protect anonymity using model inversion attacks. Our approach gives a solution to this problem by randomly manipulating features of an image rather than its pixels. In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving adversarial protector network (PPAPNet) as a tool to anonymize an image at the latent space level to simultaneously provide privacy and utility. PPAPNet consists of three networks: protector, critic, and attacker, as shown in Figure 1 .
Latent space representation of an image is a vector that contains important features of an image, such as hair, skin color, and facial expression. Convolutional autoencoders [19] , [37] are widely used to extract this representation. While adding noise to a pixel just removes details of an image, we can directly modify important features of an image by manipulating its vector representation. Radford et al. [34] demonstrate that it is possible to change features of an image by applying vector arithmetic to its latent space representation. Taking everything into consideration, protector is a encoder-decoder network that encodes an image, Figure 2a , into its vector representation (z), manipulates the z vector, and decodes the manipulated z into a new anonymized image (Figure 2c ). To train and make the anonymized image more realistic, additional mechanisms are required. Similar to Mariani et al. [29] , we first initialize protector with a pre-trained convolutional autoencoder to start the training from a more stable point. Then, we adversarially train the protector with a WGAN-GP [18] critic. The WGAN-GP critic guides the protector to generate a realistic image by evaluating its quality. To ensure that the anonymized output of a PPAPNet is safe from model inversion attacks [16] , we also add another encoder-decoder network, attacker, that tries to reconstruct the original, Figure 2a , from the anonymized image, as shown in Figure 2c . During the training process of a PPAPNet, protector defends from an attacker's inversion attack by adding noise to the z vector. However, simply adding random noise with various scales could allow attacker to successfully reconstruct the original image, as shown in Figure 3a . In addition, this could even lead protector to a mode collapse, as shown in Figure 3b . PPAPNet has a noise amplifier inside protector that learns optimal noise scaling parameters for each dimension of the z vector. A noise amplifier helps protector create images that are both realistic and immune to privacy attacks, as shown in Figure 3c . The main contributions of our work are as follows:
• We propose an image anonymization deep neural network, PPAPNet, that transforms an image into another synthetic image by adding optimized noise to the original image's latent space representation.
• We introduce an overall training strategy that enables PPAPNet to generate a realistic image that cannot be distinguished from real images in the same domain and that protects the sensitive image from privacy attacks.
• We evaluate the proposed PPAPNet methodology with various image datasets. Experimental results empirically demonstrate that our proposed PPAPNet leads to a higher level of image anonymization.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we briefly introduce important concepts of model inversion attacks, generative adversarial networks, VOLUME 7, 2019 and differential privacy mechanisms. Although our work is not differential privacy guaranteed, we utilize the noise generation concept of Laplace and the Gaussian mechanism [12] - [14] in our noise amplifier.
A. MODEL INVERSION ATTACK
Fredrikson et al. [16] explore privacy issues in modern machine learning APIs, showing that confidential information can be exploited by adversarial clients in order to mount model inversion attacks. They also provide model inversion algorithms that can be used to infer sensitive features from decision trees or to extract images of training subjects from face recognition models.
The deblurring attack [16] is a type of model inversion (MI) attack that can reconstruct the original image from the blurred image. Let us assume an adversary has an image containing a blurred-out face and wishes to learn the identity of the corresponding individual. The adversary uses the blurred image as side information in a series of MI attacks to recover the original image up to a certain degree such that it can be classified correctly with face recognition models. This means that simply blurring an image at the pixel-level is vulnerable to MI attacks. In this paper, we mainly focus on the deblurring attack and propose an alternative way to anonymize an image that is different from simply blurring and noising.
B. GENERATIVE ADVERSARIAL NETWORKS
In recent years, generative adversarial networks (GANs) [2] , [5] , [17] , [33] , [34] , [44] have been used as powerful tools to generate realistic images. The underlying idea is to train a generator and a discriminator in an adversarial mode. This idea is the most powerful concept so far among generative models. GAN is a two-player minimax game between a generator and a discriminator. From another perspective, GAN tries to minimize a distance or divergence between the model distribution (P θ ) and the real distribution (P r ). Nowozin et al. [32] states that any f -divergence can be used as the objective function. Using an appropriate f -divergence prevents mode collapse, which is a well-known problem when GAN's generator only draws one or a few foolish examples. Wasserstein GAN [2] and its improved version WGAN-GP [18] use the Earth Mover (EM) distance for the objective function and achieve state-of-the-art performance.
GANs are also widely used in the area of style transfer [7] , [22] , [23] , [45] . Kim et al. [23] use deep convolutional encoder-decoder networks as generators to find mappings between two different image domains and a DCGAN [34] discriminator to evaluate the quality of mapped images. Parts of our work are focused on finding a certain mapping that can convert an image to another image in the same domain. Similar to Kim et al. [23] , we use deep convolutional encoderdecoder networks to find this mapping. For better performance, we use a WGAN-GP critic (discriminator) to stabilize the training process. In Section 4, we also show that simply using this mapping to anonymize an image makes it vulnerable to an MI attack that tries to find the mapping between the original and the anonymized image using denoising autoencoders. We thus emphasize the importance of latent-spacelevel anonymization with a noise amplifier.
C. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Differential privacy was first introduced by Dwork et al. [12] - [14] and has been a strong standard for privacy guarantees for algorithms on aggregate databases. According to Dwork et al. [12] , differential privacy intuitively captures the increased risk to one's privacy incurred by participating in a database. It was originally defined for two adjacent datasets that differ by a single element:
Definition 1: A randomized mechanism, M : D → R, with domain D and range R satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent inputs d, d ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R, it holds that:
Laplace and Gaussian noise mechanisms are commonly used to approximate a deterministic real-valued function, f : D → R, via additive noise calibrated to f 's sensitivity s f , which is defined as the maximum of the absolute distance
The Laplace noise mechanism is defined by:
where Lap(0, b) is the Laplace distribution with location 0 and scale b. This satisfies -differential privacy if b is s f [12] .
The Gaussian noise mechanism is defined by:
where N (0, σ 2 ) is a normal (Gaussian) distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation σ . This satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy if σ is √ 2 log(1.25/δ) s f [12] .
An interesting part of the Laplace and Gaussian noise mechanisms is that we can easily manage the intensity of noise by changing the privacy budgets and δ. Since the location or mean is always set to 0, it is easy to amplify the random noise sampled from Lap(0, 1) or N (0, 1) to the noise sampled from Lap(0, b) or N (0, σ 2 ). This is the key concept of the noise amplifier inside the proposed PPAPNet.
III. PPAPNET
Recent advances in deep learning threaten traditional image anonymization techniques with deep learning based MI attacks that try to reconstruct the original image from the anonymized image. The proposed PPAPNet methodology aims to convert an image into another synthetic image that is both realistic and immune to MI attacks. The model structure is depicted in Figure 1 . PPAPNet consists of the protector P, the attacker A, and the critic C. P obtains an image x and anonymizes it into a new imagex. A tries to reconstruct x fromx. C evaluates the quality ofx.
Algorithm 1
Require: Initial protector parameters, θ 0 , initial critic parameters, wc 0 , and initial attacker parameters, wa 0 . Require: Number of critic iterations and attacker iterations per protector iteration, n critic and n attacker . Require: Batch size, m, gradient penalty coefficient, λ, Adam hyperparameters, α, β 1 , and β 2 .
1: while θ has not converged do 2: for t = 1, . . . , n critic do 3: for i = 1, . . . , m do 4: Sample real data sets x ∼ P r and x ∼ P r and a random number ∼ U [0, 1].
for t = 1, . . . , n attack do 10: for i = 1, . . . , m do 11: Sample real data set x ∼ P r . 12:x ← P θ (x) 13 :
15:
for i = 1, . . . , m do 16: Sample real data set x ∼ P r . 17:x ← P θ (x) 18 :
The protector P and the attacker A take an image of size n × n × k and feed it through an encoder-decoder pair. The encoder parts of P and A are composed of 5 convolution layers with 5 × 5 and a stride size of 2, each followed by a batch normalization [21] and a leaky ReLU [40] . The decoder part is composed of 5 deconvolution (transposed convolution) [31] layers with 5 × 5 and a stride size of 2, each followed by a batch normalization and ReLU [30] . For the last activation function of the decoder, we used a sigmoid instead of ReLU to set the final image output range between [0, 1]. The protector network also has an additive noise layer and a noise amplifier between the encoder and the decoder. The final output of the encoder is connected to a fully-connected layer and reduced to a 128-dimensional vector z. The noise amplifier adds noise to z and projects it to the same size as the decoder input.
The critic C takes an image of size n × n × k and decides whether it is real or fake. C is composed of 4 or 5 convolution layers with 5×5 and a stride size of 2, each followed by a layer normalization [3] and a leaky ReLU. We use 5 convolution layers for an image of size 64×64×3 and 4 for other images. The discriminator has an additional fully connected layer to follow the Wasserstein distance metric.
B. ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
To analyze the performance of A, we define a new term, privacy loss L priv , as the reconstruction loss between x and x. We apply the l 2 loss for the reconstruction loss of L priv .
The critic C attempts to label x as real andx as fake. Although x and x are both sampled from the real data distribution, we distinguish x and x for better understanding of our critic loss L c . For better convergence of L c , we use WGAN-GP's critic loss [18] instead of the original GAN's discriminator loss [17] . All considered, our final critic loss becomes:
where P r is the data distribution and P p is the model distribution implicitly defined byx = P(x). Gulrajani et al. [18] apply a gradient penalty to the WGAN critic withx = x + (1 − )x where is a random sample from U[0, 1]. We apply a gradient penalty on C with λ = 10. The protector P has to return an image that maximizes C(x) and L priv .
The attacker A just tries to minimize L priv .
When the PPAPNet modules are initialized, all the weights in the protector, attacker, and critic are fine-tuned by carrying out an adversarial training in Algorithm 1. When the protector parameter θ converges, P is optimized to convert an image into a synthetic image that is realistic enough to fool the VOLUME 7, 2019 critic C and strong enough to defend against model inversion attacks by the attacker A.
C. NOISE AMPLIFIER
The noise amplifier is placed in between the encoder E P and the decoder D P of the protector. E P encodes an image in its latent space representation in the form of a d-dimensional vector z d . For each dimension of z d , tries to find the optimal scale factor σ * for random noise n sampled from a probability distribution. For σ * , manipulates z d forming z d wherez d = z d + σ * n and returnsz d to D P . is a neural network that approximates σ * with a noise amplifier function σ and its d-dimensional weight parameters. As we mentioned in Section 2, we utilized the Laplace and Gaussian noise mechanisms to design our noise amplifier. We can make noise sampled from Lap(0, 1) to follow Lap(0, b) by multiplying the scale factor b by the original noise. Noise sampled from N (0, 1) also follows N (0, σ ) if it is multiplied by σ . In our experiment, we mainly use two types of , σ (s e ; ) = s e with a weight parameter of and σ (s e ; , δ) = √ 2 log(1.25/δ)
with weight parameters and δ where s e is the approximate sensitivity of E P . It is impossible to find the exact sensitivity of the unknown E P during the training. Instead, we initialize the encoder E P and decoder D P with a pre-trained autoencoder using all the images in the training set. In this work, we apply the l 2 loss minimization for the autoencoder training. After initialization, we freeze all the layers of E P so that the weights of E P will not change during the training. The approximate sensitivity s e is defined by:
where x i and x j are images sampled from the training set, S t . Another way to cope with the sensitivity issue is to normalize z in the range [−1, 1] using tanh. This allows us to assume that the upper bound of E P is 2 and use it as s e . In Section 4, we evaluate two sensitivity approximation techniques and their privacy-preserving performances. Now, the ith value of the modified vectorz i becomes:
where the z i is the ith value of the original vector z d , n 0 is the initial noise, s e is the approximate sensitivity, and σ is the noise amplifier function. The values of and δ are initialized to 1 and 1e−8, respectively, and optimized throughout the training using gradient descent in the direction of maximizing L priv .
D. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Our implementation is done using TensorFlow [1] . We trained our network with the Adam optimizer [24] with a learning rate of 0.0001, β 1 = 0.5, and β 2 = 0.9. We trained our model using a single NVIDIA Titan V GPU with a mini-batch size of 256. In our experiments, we use models with 5 different types of initial noise n 0 and noise amplifier function σ listed in Table 1 . For CelebA and LSUN bedroom, we centercropped and resized images to 64 × 64 × 3. More details regarding each dataset are shown in Table 2 . We only use test images for fair evaluations and demonstrations.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We experimentally demonstrate our model's performance using the MNIST [26] , the CIFAR-10 [25] , the CelebA [28] , and the LSUN [41] bedroom datasets. We first evaluate the sample diversity of PPAPNet with an Inception score [35] on unsupervised CIFAR-10. We also show the importance of the noise amplifier in PPAPNet by comparing the privacy gain with different experimental setups. Sample images anonymized with PPAPNet are provided in Figure 7 .
A. SAMPLE DIVERSITY ON UNSUPERVISED CIFAR-10
We measure the Inception score of PPAPNet trained with unsupervised CIFAR-10 and compare with other published GAN models. In Table 3 , the Inception scores of our models are much lower than those of all other published models. Low Inception scores usually mean higher rates of mode collapse. However, we do not find significant instances of mode collapse in our models. Samples from PPAPNets trained on CIFAR-10 are shown in Figure 5 . Considering the fact that our basic model structure is similar to DCGAN [34] and WGAN-GP [18] , we find the main cause of this phenomenon is our latent-space-level anonymization mechanism. Since we use an encoder that is pre-trained with an autoencoder to extract important features of an image, the output vector z of the protector's encoder contains meaningful features that can distinguish an image from others in the same domain. However, the main objective of the anonymization is to manipulate distinct features of an image to protect the privacy of an individual from adversarial attacks. PPAPNet accomplishes this objective by making the original feature indistinguishable from others with its differential privacy (DP) oriented additive noise mechanism. This makes the Inception network work harder to correctly classify the anonymized image lowering the Inception score.
B. PRIVACY GAIN
To evaluate the privacy preserving performance of different noise amplifiers, we use a denoising autoencoder as an adversary to perform attacks on the PPAPNets shown in Table 1 .
The adversary tries to reconstruct the original image from the PPAPNet-anonymized image. The term privacy gain is the l 2 loss between the original image and the reconstructed image. Higher privacy gain means better anonymization performance. In our experiment, we use the attacker A's model architecture for the adversary and train it using the MNIST, CelebA, and LSUN bedroom datasets. After training the adversary with training images and its PPAPNetanonymized version, we measure the privacy gain of each model in Table 1 with test images. The results are shown in Tables 4a, 4b , and 4c. Models with sensitivity approximation mechanisms (8) perform best in most of the cases with the exception of MNIST. The difference between PPAPNet-None and other models show that the noise amplifier module is an essential part of the PPAPNet architecture. We also train the adversary with blurred CelebA images to visualize the degree of privacy gain. We train the adversary on different sets of images blurred with a Gaussian filter with different standard deviations (σ ) ranging from 1 to 15. Evaluated with the trained adversary and blurred test images, the Gaussian filter with σ = 15 shows 1.24 × 10 −2 of privacy gain, while the maximum privacy gain of PPAPNet trained on CelebA is 5.53 × 10 −2 (PPAP-s e -( ) in Table 4b ). More detailed relationships between values of σ and their corresponding privacy gains are demonstrated in Figure 6 . The overall results state that simply blurring an image at the pixel-level is vulnerable to reconstruction attacks with denoising autoencoders and that our proposed PPAPNet is a solution.
C. ANONYMIZED SAMPLES
We present the anonymized image samples along with their original and the reconstruction attack result of an adversary (explained in Section 4.2) in Figure 7 . Although every PPAPNet model successfully generates realistic outputs, their performances on privacy preservation are quite different. The Adversary trained against PPAP-None easily finds the internal mapping of PPAP-None and successfully reconstructs the original image, while the adversary trained against PPAPNet with the noise amplifier only omits similar meaningless images. Even if the adversary finds the internal mapping and reconstructs the modified feature vectorz it fails to extract the real feature vector z fromz.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a methodology to anonymize the latent space representation of an image. In the proposed PPAPNet framework, the protector and the attacker are trained in adversarial mode to find the best way to protect the image from possible privacy risks. The noise amplifier inside the protector plays an important role in noise optimization for effective image anonymization. We evaluate the proposed PPAPNet with different metrics and datasets to demonstrate its powerful performance. In the future, we hope to apply the latent-space-level anonymization methodology to a broader range of data domains including video, text, and speech.
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